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Discussion After the Speeches of Daniel A. Reifsnyder and
Elizabeth Dowdeswell*
QUESTION, Professor King: What are the differences, if any, be-
tween the Canadian and the U.S. delegations on climate change?
ANSWER, Mr. Reisnyder: I think the principal difference is that
Canada has a target and a timetable for greenhouse gas productions. I
should let Liz speak to Canada's position, but it's easier to describe Can-
ada's, because, of course, the U.S. does not have a target and a timetable.
In that one respect, I think the positions are different, but on the other
hand, I would also note that the United States and Canada both support
a comprehensive approach to greenhouse gas limitation, looking not just
at carbon dioxide, as some European countries would, but at all green-
house gases and at sinks or reservoirs of gases, like forests, in addition to
sources of the gas.
Those are some of the similarities and differences, but I think, in a
number of other areas, there's a great deal that we have in common.
There's a great deal in common among the OECD countries, generally,
with regard to issues such as the need to have reporting procedures under
the Convention, the need to develop methodologies, the need to involve
developing countries, the need to have institutions created in the Conven-
tion and so forth.
COMMENT, Ms. Dowdeswell: I think Dan is quite correct. The
number of things that are similar between our two countries exceed those
that are different. However, the one that is different is, at least symboli-
cally, a very important one, and that is the issue of having a specific
target and schedule to work toward.
QUESTION, Professor King: Does not the U.S. need a target if we
are going to move forward?
ANSWER, Mr. Reifsnyder: I personally don't believe the target is
necessary, and I think it is one of the things that has been a real problem
in this climate negotiation for quite some time - in fact, I think since the
Toronto conference, which was the first conference that came up with a
statement calling for a reduction in greenhouse gases.
When that idea emerged on the world scene, it grabbed people, and
seized them; it's continued to grab them and seize them. They cannot
even think of other alternatives or other approaches, and this has been
what is so frustrating. It is a psychological issue.
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I said in my remarks that we asked a number of times, "What ex-
actly is the scientific basis for stabilization by the year 2000?" We're at a
loss, even among countries that have adopted that target, to find any
answer. In fact, there is really no scientific basis for it. We're talking
about a motivator - something that will push people into acting. We
already have a lot on the table that we feel will compare very favorably to
things other countries plan to do. We haven't needed a target in order to
do that.
So, I think the downside of the target is that there have been some
real concerns in the private sector about just what this might do and
about how it might force changes in behavior, particularly in view of the
life cycle of various technologies and the investment that you have to
make in certain technologies, which we know will not provide the kinds
of savings you're going to need over the long term in order to meet this
artificial target in a particular year. One of the concerns we have is that
in order to really solve the problem of climate change, we're looking at a
technology base change - huge changes in the way we do business and
in the technologies available. We aren't going to obtain that by targeting
some timetables in the near term.
QUESTION, Ms. L. Campbell: Could you comment on some of the
proposals for the international emissions trading concept, how that
might be played out and what your opinions are with respect to that
concept?
ANSWER, Ms. Dowdeswell: I questioned, in my remarks, whether
we would have either the courage or the wisdom to design new institu-
tions, and I think that a global tradeable emissions scheme is one with
which we haven't fully come to grips in this short period of time. I per-
sonally believe that it has some very real benefits. If we're looking not
just at specific country-related responses, but rather a global response to
a global problem, we have to look at globally cost-effective solutions. I
think some kind of global tradeable emissions scheme is one of the possi-
ble elements in such a response, but time has not allowed us the luxury of
developing such a scheme, either in technical or psychological terms,
that would be acceptable to many countries around this world. What we
have tried to do in writing the legal instrument is to make sure that we
don't foreclose the possibility of such a scheme in the future.
COMMENT, Mr. Reifsnyder: I think the U.S. has been one of the
strongest supporters of the concept of emissions trading. We, frankly,
have had more experience with it domestically than many other coun-
tries. The problem in these negotiations, I would say, is that we are at
such a relatively modest level of discussion about the fundamentals of the
Convention that it really is, as Liz said, something for the future.
QUESTION, Mr. Edwards: What kind of obligations might the dif-
ferent constituencies undertake besides simply being a party to a conven-
tion, with some enforcement rights against developed countries? Could
you give us some flavor of the positions and policies articulated by the
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newly emerging countries as they move from being developing countries
into perhaps a transitional stage?
ANSWER, Ms. Dowdeswell: I think that developing countries tend
to assume that they will have to undertake some general obligations, but
not specific obligations. OECD industrialized countries agree that they
will have not only some general obligations or commitments, but some
specific ones as well.
The specific obligations or commitments tend to relate to the limita-
tion and/or reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and the transfer of
funding and technology to developing countries. In a broad sense,
OECD countries are prepared to make those kind of commitments. It's
the words associated with them, or the specifics of the commitments, that
have not been agreed to.
Developing countries, in the view of developed countries, are being
asked to at least, as a sign of good faith, commit themselves to the spe-
cific obligation of reporting and have those reports reviewed, and then
ultimately move themselves into the camp of taking some specific
reductions.
The country that I would mention as an interesting example is Mex-
ico. I say that because I've noticed a distinct change, in the last eight
months or so, in its negotiating strategy; I think this has to do with Mex-
ico's decision that it no longer sees itself as a developing country. I think
once Mexico decided to apply for membership in the OECD, it dramati-
cally changed the way in which it wanted to be viewed by those outside.
The head of the Mexican delegation will say things like, "We are pre-
pared; we are already undertaking some energy efficiency matters; we are
already doing some of our own research; we are already committed to
doing greenhouse gas inventories," and so forth. I think countries like
Mexico, Argentina and Brazil, to some degree, see themselves as being
sort of in the waiting room, or in transition, to those more specific com-
mitments that they may be prepared to undertake. One of the things at
play is the phasing in of the Convention, so that they can be full partici-
pants to it.
COMMENT, Mr. Reifsnyder: One of the things that disturbs us so
much, at least in the U.S., about the Convention's section on principles is
that, in many cases, a lot of the principles have been inserted by develop-
ing countries who are very fearful of what might happen to them under
the Convention, and these are principles that essentially could be used to
shield these countries from having to take on certain kinds of obligations
or do certain kinds of things. I think many of these countries are very
apprehensive about what is coming down the road for them under this
Convention, and frankly, at the risk of saying this again, to some extent,
I think the whole concept of targets and timetables for OECD countries
is one of the things that may be at the root of some of these concerns.
These countries look at us and say, "Given what the OECD is willing to
do to itself today, it won't be very long before it starts coming after us."
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I think they see targets and timetables as limiting their economic growth,
and that is something they're not prepared to do.
QUESTION, Mr. Luneberg: Why does the present administration
accept the concept of caps and timetables for SO 2 and not for CO2?
ANSWER, Mr. Reifsnyder: I think that the answer is largely be-
cause this is unlike anything else we've ever dealt with. Every single
human being produces carbon dioxide in the normal course of doing
whatever he does - from people who burn wood for cooking, to people
who drive cars, to electric utilities, and so forth. It's the essence of indus-
trial society, and virtually every other society. There are so many differ-
ent sources of CO2, and it affects people so diversely, that we don't really
understand a lot of what the economic effects of these kinds of measures
can be.
The United States has been a very strong supporter of trying to de-
termine what the economic issues are. For example, we know that the
EC has a target and timetable, and one of the main elements of their plan
is switching from coal, which is highly subsidized in countries like Ger-
many, to natural gas. Natural gas happens to be available on three differ-
ent parts of the EC's perimeter - Norway, Russia and North Africa -
so it has good opportunities to switch. The EC can eliminate subsidies
for coal in the process and save a lot of money, and they've got great
price competition on their borders.
The United States doesn't have those same opportunities. We hap-
pen to be sitting on a very substantial coal reserve that could last us well
into the future. This applies to China and India as well, which both have
vast coal reserves. The issue isn't whether you can eliminate coal; the
issue is whether you can learn to use coal more efficiently. That's the
kind of thing the U.S. is doing. We're not willing to step into a rigid
regime that could block us in, and that could have uncertain economic
implications, unless and until we understand those implications much
better than we do now.
QUESTION, Ms. Dallmeyer: What portion of the target that Can-
ada has set for itself is estimated to be met by energy conservation?
ANSWER, Ms. Dowdeswell: That's a difficult question to answer in
concrete terms, not because we haven't studied it, but rather because
we're getting some very different answers. The estimate that we have is
that the actions either underway or proposed to be taken under Phase 1
of our Green Plan will not get us the full way to stabilization. The stud-
ies indicate they will get us between half, and possibly as high as two-
thirds, of the way. There are other studies showing that we will stabilize
easily, but those contain a wide variety of underlying assumptions.
Interestingly, we had some German colleagues over recently, be-
cause we could not understand how, with the same mix of measures in
both Germany and Canada, Germany was estimating it could do so
much more than we estimate we can do in Canada. It comes down to a
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wide variety of factors, such as the economic structure of the country and
the assumptions that go into the modeling exercise.
COMMENT, Mr. Reisnyder: One of the interesting things we've
determined, in researching specific conservation measures, is that there is
a difference between the technical potential of a given technology and the
market potential or market penetration of that technology. Consider the
low-flow showerhead. I have statistics listing its potential technological
improvement as fifty-eight percent, but its year 2000 market penetration
is listed at eleven percent. Anybody who has taken a shower with a low-
flow showerhead understands why the market penetration is low.
This is part of the problem. The technologies may exist, but how do
you get people to use them, particularly when the cost of the technologies
may be somewhat more than alternatives? For example, I was interested
in installing a gas air conditioner in my home. The cost of the gas air
conditioner, even with the rebates and incentives given the gas company,
was about $3800, while I could get a less efficient electric air conditioner
for $1800. Such basic decisions that each of us makes every day are go-
ing to affect the outcome of this problem in both industrialized and de-
veloping countries. The incentives you can create to get people to use
these technologies is very important to this whole process.
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